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Abstract 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given 
a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these 
dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors such as loss aversion play in the 
tradeoffs workers face? We address these issues with a theoretical model and an 
experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real 
effort task. Consistent with the basic economic theory, higher quality incentives 
encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, 
we also find that loss averse subjects shift their attention from quality to quantity 
to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform 
managers of the most appropriate ways to structure contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms face a quantity-quality output tradeoff. For instance, a floor manager at an auto plant wants 
to incentivize her workers to put together as many engines as possible, but if workers are paid only 
based on the number of completed engines, they may be careless, and the engine may break down 
well before the warranty expires. Yet if the owner rewards workers solely based on the number of 
perfect engines assembled, there will be too few engines produced. Understanding how workers 
respond to the incentive schemes arising from such quantity-quality tradeoffs is essential for 
understanding the conditions under which different wage schemes are efficient. 
How to incentivize workers is a question fundamental to economics, and an active literature 
exists on the effect of different incentive compensation schemes on worker effort.1 Indeed, worker 
productivity and quantity of output have been focuses of theoretical and empirical economic 
research for decades (Laffont and Martimort, 2009; Syverson, 2011). Some important works also 
consider the quality side of the tradeoff. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) lay out 
seminal principal-agent models that incorporate the multi-dimensional aspects of worker 
incentives, and explain why incentivizing quantity may cause agents to ignore the quality of their 
output. However, to the best of our knowledge, an empirical investigation of how workers respond 
to different quantity-quality incentives is missing from the literature. This is a particularly 
important omission given that behavioral characteristics, such as loss aversion, may affect the 
quantity-quality tradeoff in ways that are not captured by standard principal-agent models. 
                                                 
1 For instance, economists have used behavioral economics theories of gift exchange and framing to induce greater 
productivity of workers in a field setting – see Gneezy and List (2006) for gift exchange and Hossain and List (2012) 
on framing. Other notable papers include the merits of competitive or piece rate incentive schemes, including the 
gender gap in competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003), and various profit-sharing compensation schemes (Nalbantian 
and Schotter, 1997). While many of these papers have incorporated quality considerations into their work, none of 
them have evaluated quality of output directly.  
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Recent work has begun to investigate the optimal incentive contracts for workers in 
situations when the firm cares about multiple dimensions of worker output. A series of papers in 
economics have used existing data or field experiments to investigate the relative merits of flat 
rate versus piece rate incentive schemes in the workplace (Lazear, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 
2000; Shearer, 2004; Copeland and Monnet, 2009; Helper et al., 2010; Ederer and Manso, 2013; 
Al-Ubaydli et al., 2015).2 The above papers find a positive impact of piece rates on quantity of 
output, but the evidence is mixed for its impact on quality.3 For instance, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2015) 
find increases in quality, while Johnson et al. (2015) and Ederer and Manso (2013) find decreases 
in quality from pay-for performance compensation. There is also a new literature on incentives 
and creativity, documenting that financial incentives have a mixed effect on different dimensions 
of creative work, including quantity and quality (Kachelmeier et al., 2008; Charness and Grieco, 
2014; Laske and Schröder, 2015; Erat and Gneezy, 2016). Some explanations for these results 
suggest that incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation for performing certain tasks (Charness 
and Grieco, 2014; Erat and Gneezy, 2016), and that incentivizing quality may be difficult due to 
observability of quality (Kachelmeier et al., 2008; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2015). 
An important question related to how to incentivize workers is whether different workers 
should be incentivized differently. For instance, managers may wish to consider an individual’s 
ability or behavioral factors when determining a wage contract to offer. Attempts to take advantage 
of findings from behavioral economics in management and public policy have become popular in 
                                                 
2 Additional related work includes Eriksson et al. (2009) who use a real-effort experiment to examine how feedback 
about performance of others impacts quantity and quality under pay-for-performance and tournament payment 
schemes, and Bracha and Fershtman (2013) who study how competitive incentive schemes affect the combination of 
cognitive and labor efforts provided by workers. 
3 Helper et al. (2010) suggest that a piece rate may actually have a negative impact on quantity when the production 
process is complex and quality is unobservable. Similarly, Rubin and Sheremeta (2016) show that even in the gift-
exchange context uncertainty about quality can significantly decrease quantity. 
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recent years (e.g., Camerer et al., 2003; Ho et al., 2006; Madrian, 2014). A key example is loss 
aversion, which predicts that workers will evaluate gains and losses relative to a reference point, 
and will value losses more than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).4 In a setting with varying 
incentives for quantity and quality, suppose that a worker’s reference point is to receive incentives 
for quantity only. Now, if a worker chooses to take a risk to produce quality (potential for a gain), 
he or she is foregoing (or taking a loss) on quantity incentives. Hence, the concept of loss aversion 
could be a key behavioral element driving responses to quantity and quality incentives. Related 
studies have explored the design of loss framed incentive contracts on workplace effort (Fryer et 
al., 2012; Hossain and List, 2012). These studies find that presenting incentives in the form of loss 
contracts (i.e., bonuses workers could potentially lose) increases productivity relative to payoff-
equivalent gain contracts where the same bonuses are presented as gains. Recent related work also 
shows that loss averse workers actually prefer loss framed contracts (Imas et al., 2015) and that 
loss aversion plays a role in job search (DellaVigna et al., 2016). 
We contribute to the literature by examining the following questions: How do quality 
incentives impact productivity? Does incentivizing quality increase the quality of output? Does 
the quantity-quality tradeoff depend on the agent’s ability or behavioral factors? The theoretical 
model we outline provides insights into the answers to these questions, while the experiment we 
conduct provides empirical evidence. Specifically, our model of the quantity-quality tradeoff 
provides baseline predictions consistent with those found in the theoretical literature (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992), even though in our model quality is perfectly observable. In 
addition, the model highlights the idea that loss averse agents have a different quantity-quality 
                                                 
4 Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal work on loss aversion, this concept has been used to explain a variety 
of behavioral anomalies, including the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990) and status quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). 
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tradeoff, especially when incentives to perform quality work are weak. To test this model, we 
conduct an experiment in which individuals solve math problems and their output quantity 
(number of problems attempted) and quality (number of problems answered correctly) is measured 
when (i) only quantity is incentivized, (ii) some quality is incentivized, and (iii) the bulk of the 
incentives are on quality. 
In the experiment, we find evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions. Our first, 
and most straight-forward, result is that higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift 
their attention from quantity to quality and to decrease the error rate (i.e., number incorrect/number 
attempted) at the expense of lowering quantity of output. We also find that, consistent with the 
theoretical predictions, higher ability participants choose to focus more on quality and have lower 
error rates. Most importantly, we observe a behavioral component in responsiveness to the quality 
incentive. There is heterogeneity in the impact of treatment, with more loss-averse participants 
displaying greater changes to their output from a change in quality incentives. Overall, we find 
that loss aversion leads participants to focus more on quantity and less on quality, but only when 
quality is weakly incentivized. In addition, we characterize participants by whether they focus on 
pursuing quality or quantity during the experiment, and find that higher quality incentives increase 
the number of participants whose primary focus is quality. 
In what follows, Section 2 describes the theoretical model and predictions. Section 3 
outlines the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the results, and Section 5 provides a 
discussion and conclusion. 
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2. Theoretical Model and Predictions  
2.1. Theoretical Model 
In this model, we provide insight into how economic agents exert effort under different reward 
schemes for the quantity and quality of their output. We also consider how loss aversion interacts 
with the reward schemes with respect to the level of effort exerted. Consider an agent who exerts 
two-dimensional effort 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2), where 𝑒1 ≥ 0 is effort used to produce quantity and 𝑒2 ≥ 0 
is effort used to produce quality. The agent has one unit of effort to provide, so 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 = 1. The 
agent has ability 𝑎 > 0, and agents with higher ability produce high quality output at lower cost 
(for a given level of effort). 
The expected quantity of high-quality output produced, 𝐸[𝑞𝐻] = 𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2), depends on 
effort 𝑒1 used to produce quantity and effort 𝑒2 used to increase the probability of successful 
production 𝑝(𝑒2), where 𝑝′ > 0, 𝑝′′ < 0, 𝑝(0) = 0, and 𝑝(1) = 1. The expected low-quality 
output is produced with a remaining probability, i.e., 𝐸[𝑞𝐿] = 𝑒1(1 − 𝑝(𝑒2)). The cost of exerting 
effort to produce quality is 𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎), where 𝑐1 > 0, 𝑐2 < 0, 𝑐11 > 0, 𝑐12 < 0, and 𝑐(0, 𝑎) = 0. We 
use a simplifying assumption that the cost to produce quantity is not a function of ability and it is 
normalized to zero.5 The agent receives wage 𝑤1 ≥ 0 for each output (payment for quantity) and 
wage 𝑤2 ≥ 0 for each high-quality output (payment for quality). We assume that quality is 
perfectly verifiable. 
Assume that agents are also loss averse with loss aversion parameter, 𝜃. In the context of 
the model, they are averse to losing the “sure thing” wage of 𝑤1, which they would receive for 
certain if they put for zero effort to produce quality and choose 𝑒1 = 1. On the other hand, any 
                                                 
5 Including the cost of 𝑒1 in the agent’s utility function would change none of the comparative static results. 
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effort 𝑒2 comes with a probability that will not pay off. That is, the agent will make 𝑤1𝑒1 with 
probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑒2), an outcome a loss-averse agent would like to avoid. 
The expected utility of the agent is: 
𝐸[𝑈] = 𝑤1𝐸[𝑞
𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿] + 𝑤2𝐸[𝑞
𝐻] − 𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎) − 𝜃(𝑤1 − 𝑤1𝑒1) 
= 𝑤1𝑒1 + 𝑤2𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2) − 𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎) − 𝜃𝑤1(1 − 𝑒1)   (1) 
Since 𝑒1 does not enter the worker’s cost function, we have 𝑒1 = 1 − 𝑒2 at the worker’s 
optimum. Therefore, the agent’s first order condition 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑒2
= 0 is: 
−𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑝(𝑒2) + 𝑤2(1 − 𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2) − 𝑐1(𝑒2, 𝑎) − 𝜃𝑤1 = 0   (2) 
 
2.2. Predictions 
From the first order condition in (2), we can derive comparative statics related to how optimal 
effort levels respond to changes in relative wages. Consider first how effort changes as the relative 
return from producing quality increases (i.e., 𝑤2 increases relative to 𝑤1). From (2), there are 
increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2} if and only if 𝑒2 ≤ 1 −
𝑝(𝑒2)
𝑝′(𝑒2)
. Note that this also means that 
there are increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2} if and only if 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0, since 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑒2
= −𝑝(𝑒2) +
(1 − 𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2) and thus 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0 implies 𝑒2 ≤ 1 −
𝑝(𝑒2)
𝑝′(𝑒2)
. Intuitively, it must be true that 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0 at any level of 𝑒2 chosen by the agent: otherwise, increasing 𝑒2 would decrease the 
expected level of both high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 and low-quality output 𝑞𝐿.6 Hence, there are 
increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2}, and 𝑒2 is increasing in 𝑤2. Finally, there is some 𝑒
∗, which 
                                                 
6 To see this, note that 𝐸[𝑞𝐿] = (1 − 𝑒2)(1 − 𝑝(𝑒2)), which is clearly decreasing in 𝑒2. 
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solves 𝑒∗ = 1 −
𝑝(𝑒∗)
𝑝′(𝑒∗)
, which the optimal value of 𝑒2 never exceeds. This intuition is summarized 
in the following proposition and represented graphically in Figure 1. 
 
Proposition 1:  As 𝑤2 increases, the optimal value 𝑒1
∗ weakly decreases and 𝑒2
∗ weakly increases. 
 
It follows directly from Proposition 1 that 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿]
𝜕𝑤2
≤ 0 since 𝐸[𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿] = 𝑒1 and 
𝜕𝑒1
𝜕𝑤2
≤
0, implying that higher quality incentives decrease the total output (the sum of high-quality and 
low-quality output). We state this as Prediction 1: 
 
Prediction 1:  The average quantity of output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 is weakly decreasing in 𝑤2. 
 
It also follows from Proposition 1 that 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0. Recall that 𝐸[𝑞𝐻] = 𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2) =
(1 − 𝑒2)𝑝(𝑒2). Therefore, 
𝜕𝐸[𝑞𝐻]
𝜕𝑤2
=
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
(−𝑝(𝑒2) + (1 − 𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2)) ≥ 0 since 
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0 and the 
term in brackets is always non-negative in equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is that an 
increase in 𝑤2 encourages the agent to spend more effort in a manner where more high-quality 
units are produced. Sometimes this means reducing the effort 𝑒1 spent on producing quantity, as 
noted above. This brings us to the next prediction: 
 
Prediction 2: The average level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 is weakly increasing in 𝑤2. 
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Next, we define the error rate as the fraction of low-quality output relative to total output, 
or 𝐸 [
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
]. From Proposition 1, it follows that 
𝜕𝐸[
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
]
𝜕𝑤2
≤ 0. To show this, note that 𝐸 [
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
] =
𝑒1(1−𝑝(𝑒2))
𝑒1
= 1 − 𝑝(𝑒2). Therefore, 
𝜕𝐸[
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
]
𝜕𝑤2
=
𝜕(1−𝑝(𝑒2))
𝜕𝑤2
= −
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
𝑝′(𝑒2) ≤ 0 since 
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0 and 
𝑝1 > 0. This brings us to the next prediction: 
 
Prediction 3:  The average error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 is weakly decreasing in 𝑤2. 
 
Next, consider how the agent’s ability affects her decision to focus on quality effort 𝑒2. 
Since ability only enters into the cost function, it follows directly from (2) that there are increasing 
differences in {𝑒2, 𝑎}, and hence 𝑒2 is increasing in 𝑎. The intuition underlying this result is 
straight-forward: higher ability agents face a lower marginal cost from exerting effort used to 
produce quality, so they choose greater 𝑒2. This intuition is summarized in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: As 𝑎 increases, the optimal value 𝑒1
∗ weakly decreases and 𝑒2
∗ weakly increases. 
 
Predictions 4, 5, and 6 follow the same mathematical logic as Predictions 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. For the sake of brevity we do not repeat the mathematics nor the intuition, but simply 
note that the sign of 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑎
 and the sign of 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝑎
, entailing 
that the above comparative statics are the same with respect to 𝑎 as they are with respect to 𝑤2. 
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Prediction 4:  The average quantity of output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 is weakly decreasing in 𝑎. 
 
Prediction 5: The average level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 is weakly increasing in 𝑎. 
 
Prediction 6:  The average error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 is weakly decreasing in 𝑎. 
 
Finally, consider how the agent’s loss aversion parameter affects her decision to focus on 
quality effort 𝑒2. It follows directly from (2) that there are increasing differences in {𝑒2, −𝜃}, and 
hence 𝑒2 is decreasing in 𝜃. The intuition underlying this result is straight-forward: agents with 
higher loss aversion face a larger cost from exerting the type of (quality) effort that returns a 
probabilistic return relative to spending the type of (quantity) effort that returns a sure thing. 
It also follows directly from (2) that the degree to which 𝑒2 is decreasing in 𝜃 is a function 
of how large 𝑤1 is relative to 𝑤2. When 𝑤1 is relatively large, the effect is greater than it is when 
𝑤1 is small relative to 𝑤2. The intuition here is also straight-forward. When quantity is highly 
rewarded relative to quality (i.e., 𝑤1 is large relative to 𝑤2), the potential reward from exerting 
quality effort will not be enough to make up for the “loss” an agent feels, especially when they are 
loss averse. On the other hand, when quality is highly rewarded, the cost associated with loss 
aversion is lower on the margin (i.e., relative to the benefit of quality effort). This intuition is 
summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: As 𝜃 increases, the optimal value 𝑒1
∗ weakly increases and 𝑒2
∗ weakly decreases. 
The strength of these effects, 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝜃
 and 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝜃
, is decreasing in 
𝑤2
𝑤1
. 
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Predictions 7, 8, and 9 follow the same mathematical logic as Predictions 1-3 and 4-6, 
respectively. For the sake of brevity we do not repeat the mathematics nor the intuition, but simply 
note that the sign of 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of −
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝜃
 and the sign of 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of −
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝜃
, 
entailing that the above comparative statics are the same with respect to 𝑤2 and 𝑎 as they are with 
respect to −𝜃. 
 
Prediction 7:  The average quantity of output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 is weakly increasing in 𝜃, although the 
strength of this effect is decreasing in 
𝑤2
𝑤1
. 
 
Prediction 8: The average level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 is weakly decreasing in 𝜃, although 
the strength of this effect is decreasing in 
𝑤2
𝑤1
. 
 
Prediction 9:  The average error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 is weakly increasing in 𝜃, although the strength of 
this effect is decreasing in 
𝑤2
𝑤1
. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment used participants drawn from the population of undergraduate students at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Computerized experimental sessions were run using the Zurich 
Toolbox for Readymade Economics Experiments (z-Tree, Fischbacher, 2007) at the Behavioral 
Research Insights Through Experiments (BRITE) Laboratory. A total of 287 participants 
participated in 21 experimental sessions. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were 
randomly assigned to a computer station. The experiment proceeded in seven parts. All participants 
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were given written instructions (available in Appendix A) at the beginning of each part, and an 
experimenter also read the instructions aloud. 
In part 1, participants performed a real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly 
generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as quickly as possible, with no assistance other than a pen and 
paper (no calculators), for 5 minutes. The 2-digit numbers task is commonly used in the 
experimental literature because it is easy to explain, does not require previous experience and 
performance is not associated with a particular gender, socioeconomic background, or physical 
conditioning (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cason et al., 2010). In each treatment, participants 
were provided with up to 60 problems (one at a time) they could attempt to solve during 5 minutes. 
Participants could see only one problem at a time and they could not skip any problems. Each time 
a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 seconds to review it before the submit button 
appeared. After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer allowed participants to enter their 
answers. The 5 second delay can be considered an opportunity cost of skipping a problem by 
submitting any random answer.7 
In all treatments, as shown in Table 1, participants received 𝑤1 = $0.10 for each attempted 
problem (i.e., for quantity). Depending on the treatment, participants also received an additional 
bonus for each attempted problem answered correctly (i.e., for quality), varying from 𝑤2 = $0.00 
in the T-0.00 treatment to 𝑤2 = $3.00 in the T-3.00 treatment. 
In part 2, we elicited beliefs about output quality by asking participants to provide a guess 
about how many of the attempted problems they solved correctly in part 1. Participants received 
an additional $3 if their guess was equal to the number of correct answers they provided part 1. 
Participants were not aware of part 2 until after they finished part 1 of the experiment. The main 
                                                 
7 This is an important element of our design since several studies show that in real-effort experiments participants do 
not respond to incentives unless opportunity costs are introduced (Corgnet et al., 2015; Araujo et al., 2016). 
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purpose of eliciting participants’ beliefs about their performance was to test whether the measured 
quantity and quality of output from part 1 matched the participants’ own beliefs about how much 
quality they attempted. 
In order to learn whether behavioral motivations play a role in responsiveness to quality 
incentives, in parts 3-5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward ambiguity, risk and loss. 
While our theoretical model did not make a clear prediction about the role of behavioral 
motivations, such motivations have been shown to be important in principal-agent relationships in 
the field (Haigh and List, 2005; Hossain and List, 2012). 
In part 3, we elicited participants’ preferences toward ambiguity by presenting them with 
a set of 20 lotteries (see Table B1 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state 
whether they prefer an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance each) or a safe 
option B (increasing monotonically from $0.50 to $10.00).8 Parameters were set in such a way that 
more ambiguity-averse participants would choose safer options (and switch earlier to a safe option) 
than less ambiguity-averse participants. Again, participants were not aware of this part until after 
they finished the preceding parts. 
In part 4, we elicited participants’ preferences toward risk from a set of 20 lotteries (see 
Table B2 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer a 
risky option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance each) or a safe option B (increasing 
monotonically from $0.50 to $10.00). As in previous parts, participants were not aware of this part 
until after they finished the preceding parts. 
In part 5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward losses from a set of 20 lotteries (see 
Table B3 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer a 
                                                 
8 Our elicitation procedure is similar to Shupp et al. (2013). 
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risky option A (50% chance of losing a certain amount between -$0.50 to -$10.00) or a safe option 
B of $0. As in previous parts, participants were not aware of this part until after they finished the 
preceding parts. 
Part 6 was used to obtain a measure of participants’ abilities on the math task, independent 
of incentive concerns. In this part, participants again performed a real effort task (as in the first 
part of the experiment): adding up sets of five randomly generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as 
quickly as possible. This time, participants had only 2.5 minutes to complete the task. The 
computer provided participants with up to 30 math problems (one at a time) that they could attempt 
to solve during the allotted time. As before, participants could see only one problem at a time and 
they could not skip any problems. Each time a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 
seconds to review it before the submit button appeared. Participants received $0.50 for each 
problem answered correctly, regardless of the treatment. Contrary to the first part, participants 
made no earnings from attempted problems that were incorrect.  
Finally, in part 7, participants were asked to provide a guess about how many of the 
attempted problems they solved correctly in part 6. Participants received an additional $3 if their 
guess was equal to the number of correct answers they provided in part 6. Participants were not 
aware of this task until after they finished the preceding parts of the experiment. The main purpose 
of eliciting participants’ beliefs about their performance in part 6 was to obtain a measure of 
confidence, which may be linked to participants’ decision to put more effort into quality or 
quantity. This measure is comparable across treatments, since it is not affected by the quantity-
quality incentives that differ across treatments (unlike the guess in part 2, which may be a function 
of the different quantity-quality tradeoffs faced in part 1). 
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At the end of the experiment, each participant received earnings from parts 1, 2, 6 and 7. 
For parts 3-5, in order to avoid portfolio effects, only one part and one line was paid out at random. 
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Participants’ earnings ranged from $10.50 to 
$119.70, with a median of $25.60. In addition to their earnings in the experiment, participants also 
received a $7.00 show-up fee. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. How Incentives Impact Quantity and Quality 
The summary statistics of our experiment are reported in Table 2 and represented graphically in 
Figures 2-4. First, we examine how higher quality incentives (i.e., higher reward for solving 
problems correctly) impact quantity (i.e., the number of problems attempted). Prediction 1 states 
that the level of total output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 should decrease with higher quality incentives 𝑤2.  
We begin by noting that there is a significant difference in the number of problems 
attempted between treatments T-0.00 and T-0.05 (31.42 versus 23.73; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value = 0.03). In the analysis that follows, we denote the T-0.00 treatment as “zero quality 
incentive” and the T-0.05 treatment as “low quality incentive”. There are no statistically significant 
differences between treatments T-0.25 and T-0.50 where quality incentives are medium (17.00 
versus 17.71; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.65) and treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00 where 
quality incentives are high (13.35 versus 13.60; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.65). In the 
analysis that follows, we report pooled data from the “medium quality incentive” treatments T-
0.25 and T-0.50, and the “high quality incentive” treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00.9  
                                                 
9 We find no statistically significant differences for any of the outcomes reported in this section when comparing T-
0.25 and T-0.50 or when comparing T-1.00 and T-3.00. 
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Figure 2 suggests that there are clear differences in the number of problems attempted 
between treatments with zero quality incentive (i.e., T-0.00), low quality incentive (i.e., T-0.05), 
medium quality incentives (i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50) and high quality incentives (i.e., T-1.00 and 
T-3.00). Pairwise comparisons show that the differences in distributions are statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, five p-values < 0.01 and one p-value = 0.03).10 We also find significant 
differences when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, 
consistent with Prediction 1, we find that higher incentives for quality decrease quantity of output. 
 
Result 1:  Higher quality incentives decrease quantity of output. 
 
Second, we examine how higher quality incentives impact quality (i.e., the number of 
problems solved correctly). Recall that Prediction 2 states that the level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 
should increase with higher quality incentives 𝑤2. 
Figure 3 suggests that there are clear differences in the number of problems answered 
correctly between treatments for all sets of pooled treatments except for medium quality incentives 
(i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50) versus high quality incentives (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00). Indeed, we find 
a significant difference in quality between each of the other pooled groups (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test, four p-values < 0.01 and one p-value = 0.04). Meanwhile, there is no statistically significant 
difference in number of problems answered correctly between the medium- and high-quality 
incentive treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.31). We will attempt to provide an 
explanation for this result in Section 4.4. The general differences across treatments are also 
                                                 
10 These p-values are for comparison between pooled treatments. Similar results hold for comparisons for unpooled 
treatments. This is true of all comparisons presented in this section. Unpooled results are available upon request. 
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significant when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, 
consistent with Prediction 2, we find that higher incentives for quality increase quality of output. 
 
Result 2:  Higher quality incentives increase quality of output. 
 
Third, we examine how higher quality incentives impact the error rate. To calculate the 
error rate, we use the ratio of the number of problems solved incorrectly to the number of problems 
attempted. Recall that Prediction 3 states that the error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 should decrease with higher 
quality incentives 𝑤2. 
Figure 4 suggests that there are clear differences in the error rates between the four pooled 
treatments. Indeed, this is what we find (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, five p-values < 0.01 and one p-
value = 0.03). The differences are also significant when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that, consistent with Prediction 3, the error rate decreases 
with higher quality incentives. 
 
Result 3:  Higher quality incentives decrease the error rate. 
 
Together, Results 1, 2, and 3 provide strong support for the theoretical predictions of our 
model: Higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to 
quality by increasing quality of output and decreasing the error rate at the expense of lowering 
quantity of output. 
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4.2. Loss Aversion and Other Individual Characteristics 
Next, we explore whether individual characteristics impact the choice of quality versus quantity. 
To answer this question, we elicited different individual characteristics summarized in Table 3. 
The model suggests the possibility that loss aversion may play a role in the quality-quantity 
decision, so we elicited participants’ preferences regarding losses using a lottery choice 
mechanism. However, one might imagine that our loss aversion parameter is simply proxying for 
some other behavioral characteristic, such as risk or ambiguity aversion. Hence, we also elicited 
preferences regarding ambiguity and risk using multiple lottery choice mechanisms (see Table B1, 
Table B2, and Table B3 in Appendix B). Parameters of the elicitation procedure were set in such 
a way that the more loss-, ambiguity-, and risk-averse participants would choose ‘safer’ options 
relative to ‘riskier’ options (and switch earlier from a risky option to a safe option) than the less 
ambiguity-, risk- and loss-averse participant. For example, a participant who in Table B2 first 
chooses four risky options A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance) and then switches to choose 
sixteen safe options B ($2.50-$10.00 for sure), would be characterized as very risk averse, while a 
participant who first chooses sixteen risky options and then four safe options would be 
characterized as very risk seeking. Potentially, one could even calculate the range of risk aversion 
coefficients for each participant that match their decisions (Holt and Laury, 2002). However, such 
calculations would necessarily have to rely on a specific utility functional form and would require 
a much larger sample of responses per each participant in order to consistently estimate such 
coefficients (Wilcox, 2008). Therefore, in the analysis that follows we use the number of safe 
options chosen by each participant in each elicitation task as an approximation of their preferences 
regarding ambiguity, risk, and losses. Although the three elicitation tasks are not directly 
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comparable, in all three tasks, a higher number of safe options implies a higher level of aversion 
toward ambiguity, risk, and losses.11 
Moreover, in part 6 of the experiment, we elicited an independent measure of participants’ 
ability by having participants perform a real effort task for 150 seconds. In part 7, we elicited 
participants’ beliefs about their performance in part 6 (see Appendix A for details). Using these 
beliefs, we compute an individual measure of overconfidence, defined as the predicted number of 
problems solved correctly in part 6 minus the number of problems actually solved correctly. From 
Table 3, we see that the median participant is overconfident, overestimating his performance by 1 
correct problem (the mean participant overestimates performance by 0.84 correct problems). 
Next, we examine whether the elicited characteristics of participants are predictive of the 
number of problems attempted, the number of problems solved, and the error rate. First, we 
examine what factors influence the number of problems attempted. Table 4 shows the estimation 
results of different OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is quantity of output (the 
number of problems attempted), and the independent variables are dummies for the various pooled 
treatments, a measure of ability, and various behavioral measures. Specifications (2)-(7) support 
the non-parametric results by showing that low, medium, and high quality incentives decrease 
quantity of output relative to zero quality incentives, and more generally that higher quality 
incentives decrease quantity of output relative to lower quality incentives (as indicated by the p-
value at the bottom of Table 4). Also note that specifications (2)-(7) indicate that there is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the participant’s ability and quantity of output. 
This is contrary to Prediction 4, which suggested that total quantity should be decreasing in ability. 
                                                 
11 A simple correlation analysis shown in Table B4 in Appendix B indicates that there is a strong correlation between 
ambiguity-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.67), and somewhat weaker correlation between loss-aversion and 
ambiguity-aversion (ρ = 0.30) and loss-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.35). 
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A potential explanation is that the relationship between ability and quantity is non-linear: 
participants of sufficiently high ability may have been able to exert little effort on quality while 
still answering problems correctly, thus achieving higher quality and quantity. This insight does 
not follow directly from the model,12 but it does make intuitive sense. To address this possibility, 
we include an ability-squared term in regressions reported in Table B5 in Appendix B. The 
coefficient on the squared term is positive and statistically significant while the coefficient on the 
ability variable is negative but statistically insignificant, indicating that at sufficiently high ability 
levels participants can focus on quantity without, presumably, losing much quality; see Table 5. 
We next examine the impact of elicited individual characteristics on quantity of output, 
reported in specifications (3)-(7). Consistent with Prediction 7, we find that loss aversion is a 
significant predictor of quantity, with participants who are more loss-averse choosing to focus on 
quantity by attempting more problems; see specification (3). Intuitively, by focusing on quantity, 
participants can always guarantee a certain amount of payment for their performance, while 
focusing on quality involves the possibility of not solving the problem correctly. Therefore, a loss-
averse participant should focus mainly on quantity in order to minimize potential losses. Prediction 
7 also indicates that the connection between loss aversion and quantity should be decreasing in the 
quality incentive. The interpretation is that loss aversion is less salient when incentives for quality 
are high, because the loss incurred from spending more time on a problem is smaller relative to 
the potential gain of getting the problem correct. To test this prediction, we include additional 
interaction terms; see specification (4).13 Besides confirming our previous findings, we also find 
                                                 
12 Although a simple addition to the model, where the probability of producing high-quality output is in part a function 
of ability, could yield this result. 
13 Including interaction terms with overconfidence and ambiguity does not yield any statistically significant results, 
and we therefore do not report these results for the sake of brevity. The interaction terms with risk aversion do yield 
statistically significant results when the number attempted is the dependent variable, but not in regressions with the 
other dependent variables reported in this section. These results are available upon request. 
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that higher quality incentives affect loss-averse participants less. Yet, we also find that loss 
aversion is not simply a proxy for some other behavioral characteristic. Specifications (5), (6), and 
(7) indicate that overconfidence, risk, and ambiguity are not predictive of quantity. We report 
additional robustness checks with individual treatment dummies in Table B6 in Appendix B. 
 
Result 4:  Participants focus more on quantity (attempt more problems) if they have higher 
ability or are more loss-averse, although the effect of loss aversion is mitigated at 
higher quality incentives. 
 
Next, we examine what factors influence the choice of quality (the number of problems 
solved). The estimation results reported in Table 5 provide support for the non-parametric results 
that higher quality incentives increase quality of output. Also, we find that consistent with 
Prediction 5, ability is positively and significantly correlated with quality, suggesting that 
participants of higher ability are more likely to focus on quality of output. This is not simply a 
matter of participants who are better at math in part 6 being better at math in part 1: whether 
participants focus on quantity is a decision in part 1. Furthermore, consistent with Prediction 8, we 
find that loss aversion is again a significant predictor of quality, with participants who are less 
loss-averse choosing to focus on quality by solving more problems; see specifications (3) and (4). 
Again, this finding is intuitive, since focusing on quality entails losing out on the sure wage, i.e., 
𝑤1 = $0.10, associated with focusing on quantity. Hence, more loss averse participants are less 
willing to take such a loss. As was the case in the quantity regressions, loss aversion only shows 
up as salient in the low quality incentive treatments; see specification (4). Intuitively, in the low 
quality incentive treatments, the benefit of focusing on quality is low relative to the loss of the sure 
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wage associated with focusing on quantity. As the quality incentive increases, the latter loss 
becomes relatively less salient. We report additional robustness checks with individual treatment 
dummies in Table B7 in Appendix B. 
 
Result 5:  Participants focus more on quality (solve more problems correctly) if they have 
higher ability and if they are less loss-averse, although the effect of loss aversion 
is mitigated at higher quality incentives. 
 
Finally, we examine what factors influence the error rate. The estimation results reported 
in Table 6 provides support for the non-parametric results that higher quality incentives decrease 
the error rate. Moreover, consistent with Prediction 6, in all specifications we find that ability is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the error rate, suggesting that participants of higher 
ability have lower error rates. Consistent with Prediction 9, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between loss aversion and the error rate in specifications (4) and (5), confirming our 
previous findings relating loss aversion to quantity and quality. We report additional robustness 
checks with individual treatment dummies in Table B8 in Appendix B. 
 
Result 6:  Participants have higher error rates if they have lower ability or if they are more 
loss-averse, although the effect of loss aversion is mitigated at higher quality 
incentives. 
 
To summarize, Results 4, 5, and 6 indicate that there are important individual 
characteristics impacting the quantity-quality tradeoff. First, we find that there is heterogeneity in 
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the impact of treatment, with more loss-averse individuals displaying greater changes to their 
output from a change in quality incentives. In the zero and (occasionally) low quality incentive 
treatments, loss aversion leads participants to focus more on quantity and less on quality, while 
increasing the error rates. This effect disappears with medium and high quality incentives. Also, 
we find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions, higher ability participants choose to focus 
more on quality and have lower error rates. 
 
4.3. Classification of Participants 
Next, we characterize participants by response time to identify how treatment differences affected 
the incentives of participants to focus primarily on quantity or quality. We begin by examining 
how much time participants spend on average on a given problem, which we consider an indicator 
of how much effort participants exert on quality. We assume that participants who spend more 
time on a problem than the average are more likely to be focusing on quality. As suggested by 
column 1 of Table 7, there are significant differences in the average time spent on a problem when 
comparing pooled treatments (zero quality incentive, low quality incentive, medium quality 
incentive, and high quality incentive). Pairwise comparisons for all show that the differences in 
distributions are statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, four p-values < 0.01 and two p-
values < 0.03). The difference are also significant when comparing all treatment jointly (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Table 7 also reports the fraction of problems answered ‘quickly’ (signifying that a 
participant is focusing on quantity) by treatment. Recall that each participant had to spend a 
minimum of 5 seconds on each problem since the ‘submit’ button did not appear on the screen 
until 5 seconds had passed. We therefore look at different cut-off points – 6, 7, and 10 seconds – 
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to see whether participants answer more quickly when quality is not incentivized. We find that 
38% of problems are answered within 6 seconds when the reward for solving problems is not 
incentivized, i.e., T-0.00, while only 1% answer within 6 seconds when the reward is highly 
incentivized, i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00 (Kruskal-Wallis test across all six treatments, p-value < 0.01). 
A similar pattern is observed for participants answering within 7 seconds (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-
value < 0.01) and within 10 seconds (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Finally, Figure 6 and the last column in Table 7 shows the fraction of participants choosing 
to focus only on quality. We define a participant as focusing on quality on a specific question if 
they either answered the question correctly or they spent at least 10 seconds answering the 
question.14 As expected, we find that higher quality incentives increase the number of quality types 
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
 
Result 7:  Higher quality incentives increase the number of participants focusing on quality 
and decrease the number of participants focusing on quantity. 
 
4.4. “Close but not quite”: Fine-Tuning the Quality Metric 
In this section, we re-visit a puzzle laid out in Section 4.1: although participants in the medium 
quality incentive treatments had higher error rates than those in the high quality incentive 
treatments, they correctly answered a similar number of questions. In other words, we found no 
                                                 
14 We calculated numerous metrics of choosing “quality” or “quantity” (also see Table 9). For instance, another metric 
we considered was that a participant chose quality if they spent as much time answering the problem as the minimum 
time it took them to answer a question in part 6 (where quantity was not incentivized and payouts were the same across 
treatments). Results are similar in all specifications, and the statistics associated with other metrics are available upon 
request. Moreover, in all of the definitions we do not count decisions made in the last 30 seconds or decisions made 
in the participant’s last answer because the decision-making calculus at the end of the five minute period may be 
different than in the first four minutes. For instance, one who can correctly answer a problem in 10 seconds (meaning 
that she should focus on quality in most of the treatments) has incentive to input a quick answer if there are only 6 
seconds remaining.  
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statistically significant difference in the quality of output between participants in the two sets of 
treatments, although we did find a statistically significant difference in the error rate. We also 
reported in Section 4.1 that participants in the medium quality incentive treatments had higher 
quantity (i.e., number attempted) than those in the high quality incentive treatments. Combining 
these insights suggests that participants in the medium quality incentive treatments answered 
quicker – leading to a higher error rate – but not so quickly that they never answered correctly. In 
other words, these results indicate the possibility that participants in the medium quality treatments 
made quick, educated guesses at the correct answer. 
To test this possibility, we fine tune our measure of quality by considering “guesstimates”: 
answers that are within 20 of the correct answer but not correct.15 Such answers suggest some 
effort – they are not merely the result of participants flying through the questions to pocket the 
$0.10 per question attempted. Figure 7 reports the mean by treatment. Not surprisingly, 
“guesstimating” is decreasing in the quality incentive, and the differences between treatments are 
statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). The logic behind this result is clear: 
since participants are only incentivized to get the problem exactly correct (and not simply close to 
correct), the benefit to spending more time on a problem is increasing in the amount paid for 
quality. This finding is also consistent with the results reported in Section 4.3, where we found 
that higher quality incentives led participants to spend more time on problems. 
These non-parametric results are confirmed in Table 8, which reports OLS estimates where 
the dependent variable is our metric of guesstimates. Again, the number of guesstimates is 
decreasing in the quality incentive. Perhaps unsurprisingly, overconfidence is positively correlated 
                                                 
15 We have calculated similar results at cutoff points at within 5 and 10 of the correct answer and results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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with guesstimates; see specification (5). Those who are overconfident in their ability may suspect 
they can answer more correctly and with greater speed than they actually can.  
 
Result 8:  Higher quality incentives decrease the number of participants “guesstimating” the 
correct answer. 
 
These results therefore suggest an answer to the puzzle noted at the beginning of the 
section. Participants in medium quality treatment treatments “guesstimated” about one more 
problem on average than those in high quality incentive treatments. In the context of our 
experiment, this suggests that enough of these guesstimates were correct that the higher number 
attempted offset the higher error rate in the medium quality incentive treatments. More broadly, 
these results suggest that high quality output can be achieved with modest quality incentives, so 
long as it does not matter to the principal that the agents occasionally err. 
 
4.5. Optimal Choice of Quantity and Quality 
A participant making a decision of whether to focus on quantity or quality should take into account 
her ability to perform the task. As we have already shown, such ability is indeed important in 
making this decision. However, another important factor is the payment the participant is rewarded 
for quality. For example, when the reward is 𝑤2 = $0.25, the participant should expect to earn 
$0.35 (𝑤1 = $0.10 for quantity and 𝑤2 = $0.25 for quality) for successfully completing a task, 
which comes at the cost of spending time on that task (say 𝑥 seconds depending on the ability). 
However, the participant also has an option to focus solely on quantity, which would result in a 
reward of 𝑤1 = $0.10 at the cost of a minimum 5 seconds spent on the task. Therefore, each 
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participant should make a choice of whether to focus on quantity or quality depending on their 
relative ability to complete the task in 𝑥 seconds and prices 𝑤1 and 𝑤2. Specifically, if (𝑤1 +
𝑤2)/𝑥 > 𝑤1/5 then a participant should focus on quality, and otherwise they should focus on 
quantity. One immediate implication is that higher 𝑤2 should lead participants to pay more 
attention to quality. See a more formal discussion of this argument in Section 2, Proposition 1. 
We can therefore calculate how many participants should have chosen to focus on quality 
given their ability. As a proxy for ability, we use the average time a participant needs to solve one 
problem correctly in part 6. Table 9 summarizes the average ability of participants across 
treatments: the first column reports the average number of seconds participants spent on each 
problem in part 6 in each treatment. Not surprisingly, since participants were randomly assigned 
to each treatment, there is no difference in ability between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 
= 0.46). However, since the reward for quality is different across treatments, the expected earnings 
are different. For example, when the reward is $0.25 per correct answer, a participant who spends 
30 seconds to solve one problem correctly should expect to earn $3.50 if she chooses to focus on 
quality, i.e., ($0.25 + $0.10) × 300/30 = $3.50. However, if instead, such a participant chooses to 
focus solely on quantity, she can earn $6 since the opportunity cost is 5 seconds of moving to the 
next problem, i.e., $0.10 × 300/5 = $6.00. Therefore, a rational decision maker who can solve only 
one problem during 30 seconds should choose to focus on quantity when the reward for quality is 
$0.25. Similar computations can be performed for all participants in each treatment. Table 9 reports 
the fraction of participants who should choose quality over quantity based on their ability and 
quality incentives. 
27 
 
Obviously, when the reward for quality is $0.00, nobody should focus on quality.16 The 
same is true when the reward is only $0.05 for all but the most mathematically gifted (none of 
whom took part in this treatment). When the reward is $0.25, 15% of participants should choose 
to focus on quality. When the reward is $0.50 this number increases to 79%, and further to 98% 
when the reward is $1.00. Finally, when the reward is $3.00, all participants should focus on 
quality. Using this information, we can calculate the portion of participants in each treatment that 
chose to correctly focus on quantity or quality. We first calculate their average earnings from 
focusing on quality, as measured by the average time they spent deriving a correct answer in part 
6 (see Table 9). Using this measure, we calculate their expected earnings from focusing on quality, 
which equals (300 / average seconds per correct answer) × ($0.10 + 𝑤2), where 𝑤2 differs by 
treatment. Any participant whose expected earnings from focusing on quality exceed $6 (the 
amount one could earn from solely focusing on quantity) should focus on quality; otherwise they 
should focus on quantity. We consider it a mistake for a participant to focus on quality (even once) 
when she should focus on quantity or for a participant to focus on quantity (even once) when she 
should focus on quality.17 Table 9 shows that 80% of participants make mistakes when quality is 
not incentivized, 96% of participants make a mistake when there is a low quality incentive, while 
only 15-16% make mistakes when the reward is highly incentivized (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00). 
These differences are jointly significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01).18 
                                                 
16 It is also possible that some participants may choose to focus on quality simply because they enjoy adding numbers. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) note that “we shall not suppose that all work is unpleasant. A worker on the job may 
take pleasure in working up to some limit.” 
17 We do not use the term “mistake” in a pejorative manner; it is likely that money maximization is not the only aspect 
of participants’ utility functions. So, while participants very well may have been maximizing their utility by making 
a “mistake”, our measure allows us to see how many participants are not making the correct money maximizing 
choices. Similar to before, we do not count decisions made in the last 30 seconds or decisions made in the participant’s 
last answer in this calculation. 
18 The same conclusion stands when we drop the first 34 seconds of experiment, which is one standard deviation above 
the mean time taken to answer a question in part 6 (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
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Result 9:  Higher quality incentives encourage participants to make better tradeoffs between 
quantity and quality, reducing inefficient decision making. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality 
constraint. It is not trivial to incentivize economic agents to care about both the quantity and quality 
of their output. A large literature suggests that incentives designed to encourage certain behaviors 
may backfire (Bowles, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). For example, 
incentives that are ‘too small’ may crowd out intrinsic motivation to put forth effort (Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000).19 The problem becomes even more complicated when behavioral factors such 
as loss aversion are incorporated into consideration. Yet, understanding the role that behavioral 
factors play in the quantity-quality tradeoff can inform managers of the most appropriate ways to 
structure contracts. 
We provide a theoretical model and conduct an experiment to examine how incentivizing 
quality impacts individual decisions to focus on quality versus quantity, as well as how one’s 
preferences regarding loss affects that decision. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find 
that higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality 
and decrease the error rate at the expense of lowering quantity of output. We also find that, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions, higher ability participants choose to focus more on 
                                                 
19 Along these lines, Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) provide evidence that monetary incentives may decrease 
(instead of increasing) blood donations. Rietz et al. (2013) show that imposing restrictive rules may have a detrimental 
impact on a gift-exchange relationship. 
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quality and have lower error rates, while those exhibiting greater loss aversion choose to focus 
more on quantity, but only when quality incentives are weak. 
Our findings have direct practical relevance for managers and employers. First, we show 
both theoretically and experimentally that there are important quantity-quality tradeoffs that should 
be taken into account when designing contracts. For example, a manager who is highly concerned 
with the quality of output may choose to incentivize high-quality output. This should lead to higher 
quality of output and a lower error rate. However, it will most likely decrease quantity of output. 
Moreover, the results of our experiment show that although greater quality incentives are optimal 
to impose when the return on quality is large, the return on higher wages diminishes rapidly past 
a certain point. Therefore, the optimal compensation scheme should involve a balance between 
rewarding quantity and quality. For instance, Mauboussin (2012) provides the example of the 
Wallace Company, a pipe and valve distributor that won the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Award in 1990 but had to file for bankruptcy two years later. Mauboussin 
concludes that “both too little and too much quality can be bad for a company’s financial 
performance.” Our study provides both theoretical and empirical evidence for this insight. 
Second, our findings contribute to the literature examining how behavioral components 
can be used to improve work outcomes (Haigh and List, 2005; Hossain and List, 2012). Hossain 
and List (2012), for example, show that a manager can significantly improve the performance of 
workers by framing contracts in terms of “losses”. Imas et al. (2016) show in a laboratory 
experiment that loss averse workers are more likely to prefer to enter contracts framed as losses, 
and they also work harder under loss contracts. We also find in our experiment that more loss-
averse participants display greater changes to their output from a change in quality incentives. 
Participants who are more loss-averse choose to focus more on quantity, increasing the error rates, 
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when quality incentives are low. Therefore, a manager who is highly concerned with the quality 
of output may choose to avoid framing contracts in terms of losses to reduce the tendency of loss 
averse workers to focus on quantity rather than quality. 
Another practical application of our findings relates to an ongoing discussion in health 
economics on how to reward physicians in order to improve medical practice and increase social 
welfare. One part of the debate is whether to reward physicians solely for the volume of services 
they order (quantity) or to incorporate certain quality measures (quality).20 Our findings suggest 
that rewarding quality is indeed effective in increasing quality of output and decreasing the error 
rate. However, in our experiment, it is easy to define and measure quality, which is not always the 
case in the medical field where quality is ill-defined and may be difficult to measure (Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2011; Godager et al., 2016).21  
                                                 
20 See the following article in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/nyregion/new-york-city-
hospitals-to-tie-doctors-performance-pay-to-quality-measures.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp 
21 Incorporating quality incentives into a payment scheme can be difficult because measures of quality are not well 
defined and it can be difficult to monitor the quality. Other concerns with using pay-for-performance payment schemes 
are that some doctors will choose to pass on hard patients, while others will choose to perform too many treatments 
to assure good quality. 
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Figure 1: Optimal values of 𝒆𝟏
∗  and 𝒆𝟐
∗  over different values of 𝒘𝟐 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Measure of quantity (average problems attempted) by treatment 
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Figure 3: Measure of quality (average problems correct) by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Error rate by treatment 
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Figure 5: Fraction of problems answered in less than 10 seconds 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Fraction of participants focusing only on quality 
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Figure 7: “Guesstimates” (answer within 20 of correct but not correct) by treatment 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments 
 
Treatment 
Payment for each problem 
N Attempted Correct 
T-0.00 $0.10 $0.00 45 
T-0.05 $0.10 $0.05 48 
T-0.25 $0.10 $0.25 46 
T-0.50 $0.10 $0.50 51 
T-1.00 $0.10 $1.00 52 
T-3.00 $0.10 $3.00 45 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Reward 
Average 
attempted 
Average 
correct 
Average 
incorrect 
Error rate = 
incorrect/attempted N 
$0.00 31.42 5.47 25.96 0.70 45 
 (2.47) (0.94) (3.10) (0.05)  
$0.05 23.73 7.50 16.23 0.54 48 
 (1.83) (0.79) (2.42) (0.05)  
$0.25 17.00 10.54 6.46 0.31 46 
 (1.09) (0.65) (1.36) (0.04)  
$0.50 17.71 10.71 7.00 0.33 51 
 (1.04) (0.73) (1.28) (0.04)  
$1.00 13.35 10.92 2.42 0.18 52 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.45) (0.02)  
$3.00 13.60 11.58 2.02 0.16 45 
 (0.69) (0.74) (0.34) (0.03)  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Elicited characteristics  
 
Percentile Loss Ambiguity Risk 
Ability 
(correct in part 6) 
Overconfidence 
(guess – correct) 
Min 0 0 0 0 -3 
25% 14 10 10 5 0 
50% 15 11 11 6 1 
75% 17 13 12 7 1 
Max 20 20 20 17 5 
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Table 4: OLS regressions of quantity 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability 0.43 0.59*** 0.56** 0.47** 0.67*** 0.58** 0.59*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Low quality incentives  -7.42*** -7.80*** 13.73 -7.40*** -7.46*** -7.44*** 
  (T-0.05)  (1.99) (1.98) (9.47) (1.99) (2.00) (2.00) 
Medium quality incentives  -14.40*** -14.92*** 17.27* -14.39*** -14.39*** -14.42*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (1.74) (1.73) (8.90) (1.74) (1.74) (1.74) 
High quality incentives  -18.04*** -18.18*** 16.65** -17.96*** -17.96*** -18.02*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (1.73) (1.72) (7.92) (1.73) (1.74) (1.74) 
Loss aversion   0.45** 2.32***    
   (0.18) (0.47)    
Loss aversion ×    -1.53**    
  Low quality incentives    (0.64)    
Loss aversion ×    -2.23***    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.59)    
Loss aversion ×    -2.43***    
  High quality incentives    (0.54)    
Overconfidence     0.53   
     (0.49)   
Risk aversion      0.13  
      (0.20)  
Ambiguity aversion       0.06 
       (0.19) 
Constant 16.74*** 27.92*** 21.73*** -4.42 26.99*** 26.54*** 27.26*** 
 (1.76) (1.96) (3.21) (6.78) (2.14) (2.91) (2.89) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.31 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.01 0.02 -- 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 5: OLS regressions of quality 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.41*** 1.48*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Low quality incentives  2.66*** 2.79*** -2.51 2.68*** 2.67*** 2.67*** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.76) (0.76) (3.70) (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) 
Medium quality incentives  4.35*** 4.53*** -4.26 4.36*** 4.35*** 4.36*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.66) (0.66) (3.48) (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) 
High quality incentives  5.56*** 5.61*** -1.33 5.66*** 5.54*** 5.55*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.66) (0.65) (3.10) (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) 
Loss aversion   -0.15** -0.58***    
   (0.07) (0.18)    
Loss aversion ×    0.37    
  Low quality incentives    (0.25)    
Loss aversion ×    0.60**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.23)    
Loss aversion ×    0.49**    
  High quality incentives    (0.21)    
Overconfidence     0.60***   
     (0.18)   
Risk aversion      -0.03  
      (0.08)  
Ambiguity aversion       -0.04 
       (0.07) 
Constant 0.81 -2.71*** -0.59 5.35** -3.77*** -2.38** -2.24** 
 (0.63) (0.75) (1.22) (2.65) (0.80) (1.11) (1.10) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.01 0.01 -- 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.02 0.04 -- 0.01 0.02 0.03 
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Table 6: OLS regressions of the error rate 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/attempted) 
Ability -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Low quality incentives  -0.17*** -0.18*** 0.09 -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medium quality incentives  -0.35*** -0.36*** 0.20 -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
High quality incentives  -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.04 -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.52*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Loss aversion   0.01** 0.04***    
   (0.00) (0.01)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.02    
  Low quality incentives    (0.02)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.04**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.02)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.03**    
  High quality incentives    (0.01)    
Overconfidence     0.01   
     (0.01)   
Risk aversion      0.01  
      (0.01)  
Ambiguity aversion       0.00 
       (0.00) 
Constant 0.62*** 0.92*** 0.78*** 0.39** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.18) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.10 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.41 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 
Table 7: Classification of participants by response time 
 
Reward 
Average time 
per problem 
Fraction guessed 
< 6 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 7 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 10 seconds 
Fraction only 
choosing quality 
$0.00 13.43 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.24 
 (1.38) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
$0.05 16.26 0.24 0.33 0.40 0.38 
 (1.19) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
$0.25 19.54 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.59 
 (1.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
$0.50 18.85 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.55 
 (0.88) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
$1.00 23.61 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.87 
 (0.88) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) 
$3.00 23.11 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.84 
 (0.88) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 8: OLS regressions of “guesstimates” 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = “Guesstimate” (incorrect but within 20 of correct answer) 
Ability 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 
  (correct in part 6) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Low quality incentives  -1.69** -1.72** 5.04 -1.68** -1.68** -1.68** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.78) (0.78) (3.83) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) 
Medium quality incentives  -2.81*** -2.84*** 5.74 -2.80*** -2.81*** -2.80*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.68) (0.68) (3.60) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) 
High quality incentives  -3.93*** -3.94*** 1.84 -3.87*** -3.94*** -3.93*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.67) (0.68) (3.20) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) 
Loss aversion   0.03 0.43**    
   (0.07) (0.19)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.47*    
  Low quality incentives    (0.26)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.59**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.24)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.41*    
  High quality incentives    (0.22)    
Overconfidence     0.34*   
     (0.19)   
Risk aversion      -0.02  
      (0.08)  
Ambiguity aversion       -0.02 
       (0.07) 
Constant 2.68*** 5.06*** 4.63*** -1.00 4.46*** 5.28*** 5.33*** 
 (0.61) (0.76) (1.26) (2.74) (0.83) (1.13) (1.13) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.09 0.09 -- 0.09 0.09 0.10 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.04 0.04 -- 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 
 
 
Table 9: Ability and expected earnings from quality 
 
Reward 
Average seconds 
per correct 
answer (part 6) 
Expected 
earnings 
from quality 
Fraction should 
 focus on 
quality Mistake 
$0.00 30.47 1.28 0.00 0.80 
 (3.76) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) 
$0.05 33.69 1.73 0.00 0.96 
 (3.80) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) 
$0.25 23.91 4.84 0.15 0.93 
 (1.13) (0.23) (0.05) (0.04) 
$0.50 28.90 8.11 0.76 0.61 
 (3.07) (0.50) (0.06) (0.07) 
$1.00 28.10 13.75 0.98 0.15 
 (2.22) (0.65) (0.02) (0.05) 
$3.00 27.49 40.50 1.00 0.16 
 (2.46) (2.49) (0.00) (0.05) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication): Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds 
for this research. The instructions are simple.  
The experiment will proceed in 7 parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of choices that determine your total earnings. The currency used in all parts of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. 
You have already received a $7.00 participation fee. Your earnings from 7 parts of the experiment will be added to 
your participation fee. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim 
out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
PART 1 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems. At the end of the whole experiment, your entire earnings will be paid out to you immediately 
and in cash. 
You will have 5 minutes (300 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 60 math 
problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 5 minutes. Each problem will consist of adding 5, 
two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems one at a time 
and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
 For each problem you attempt, you will receive $0.10.  
 For each attempted problem you answer correctly, you will receive a bonus of $0.50.  
 For each attempted problem you answer incorrectly, you will receive a penalty of -$0.00.  
Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 5 minutes are up, time will be called. You will 
not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After time is 
called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not count 
as an attempt. An example of a problem screen is shown below. 
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Note that you will know which problem you are on. The 5 numbers that you should add are listed in the 
middle of the screen. In this example, you should be adding 28+39+48+23+25. 
Each time you arrive at a new problem, you will have 5 seconds to review it before the submit button appears. 
After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer will allow you enter your answer. Although you will be required to 
spend at least 5 seconds on each problem, you can also spend more than 5 seconds. 
Press “Submit” when you are ready to go on to the next problem. 
You will not know if you answered any one problem correctly or incorrectly until the end of the experiment, 
when you will learn your total number of correct and incorrect responses. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 2 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 1 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 1.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
PARTS 3-5 
In PARTS 3-5 of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
In each PART, you will see a table with 20 lines. You will state whether you prefer Option A or Option B in 
each line. You should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line in PARTS 
4-6 will be the ‘line that counts’ and will be paid out.  
 At the end of the experiment, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 3, 4, 5. Depending on 
which card is chosen, either PART 3, PART 4, or PART 5 will “count” 
 Then, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 1, 2, ….20. The number on the card chosen 
indicates which line in that part will be paid out 
Because each line is equally likely to be selected, and because you do not know which line will be selected 
when you make your choices, you should pay close attention to the choices you make in each line. In some lines, 
depending on the decisions you make, you may earn up to $10. 
 
PART 3 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. The balls are either white or orange, but you do not 
know the exact number of white and orange balls before you make your decision. Before you draw the ball you choose 
a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive $10. If the 
drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
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Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.00 for sure  
17 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 4 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. 
That means that when we draw a ball, there is a 50% chance that it is white and a 50% chance that it is orange. Before 
you draw the ball you choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, 
you will receive $10. If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
   
Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.00 for sure  
46 
 
17 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 5 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 20 lines 
in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive $0. If you chose option A in that line, you can receive either a loss between -$1 and -$20, depending on 
the line, or a gain of $10. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we will randomly draw a ball 
from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. Before you draw the ball you 
choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive -$x (the 
exact amount depends on the line chosen). If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $10. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
 
Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 -$1.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.00 for sure  
2 -$2.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
3 -$3.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
4 -$4.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
5 -$5.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 6 -$6.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
7 -$7.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
8 -$8.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
9 -$9.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
10 -$10.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 11 -$11.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
12 -$12.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
13 -$13.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
14 -$14.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
15 -$15.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
16 -$16.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
17 -$17.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
18 -$18.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
19 -$19.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
20 -$20.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
 
PART 6 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems.  
You will have 2 and a half minutes (150 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 30 
math problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 2 and a half minutes. Each problem will consist 
of adding 5, two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems 
one at a time and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
 For each problem you answer correctly, you will receive $0.50.  
 There is no penalty for incorrect problems, and no earnings from attempted problems that are not correct 
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Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 2 and a half minutes are up, time will be called. 
You will not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After 
time is called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not 
count as an attempt. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 7 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 6 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 6.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Earnings Sheet 
  Result Your Earnings 
PART 1 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 2 – Guessing Game 
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Actual Number of Problems Correct  
PARTS 3 - 5 Line Games 
Which Part is Chosen?   ☐ PART 3   ☐ PART 4    ☐ PART 5 
Line that Counts (1-20)  
 
Color Chosen (White or Orange)  
PART 6 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 7 - Guessing Game 
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Actual Number of Problems Correct  
TOTAL: $ 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication): Additional Information 
 
Table B1: Elicitation of ambiguity aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $0.50 for sure 
# 2 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.00 for sure 
# 3 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.50 for sure 
# 4 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.00 for sure 
# 5 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.50 for sure 
# 6 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.00 for sure 
# 7 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.50 for sure 
# 8 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.00 for sure 
# 9 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.50 for sure 
# 10 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.00 for sure 
# 11 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.50 for sure 
# 12 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.00 for sure 
# 13 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.50 for sure 
# 14 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.00 for sure 
# 15 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.50 for sure 
# 16 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.00 for sure 
# 17 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.50 for sure 
# 18 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.00 for sure 
# 19 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.50 for sure 
# 20 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $10.00 for sure 
Participants choose between an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or $10.00 
with unknown chance) or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B2: Elicitation of risk preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.50 for sure 
# 2 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $1.00 for sure 
# 3 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $1.50 for sure 
# 4 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $2.00 for sure 
# 5 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $2.50 for sure 
# 6 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $3.00 for sure 
# 7 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $3.50 for sure 
# 8 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $4.00 for sure 
# 9 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $4.50 for sure 
# 10 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $5.00 for sure 
# 11 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $5.50 for sure 
# 12 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $6.00 for sure 
# 13 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $6.50 for sure 
# 14 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $7.00 for sure 
# 15 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $7.50 for sure 
# 16 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $8.00 for sure 
# 17 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $8.50 for sure 
# 18 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $9.00 for sure 
# 19 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $9.50 for sure 
# 20 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $10.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% 
chance) or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
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Table B3: Elicitation of loss aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice risky option safe option 
# 1 -$0.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 2 -$1.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 3 -$1.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 4 -$2.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 5 -$2.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 6 -$3.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 7 -$3.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 8 -$4.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 9 -$4.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 10 -$5.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 11 -$5.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 12 -$6.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 13 -$6.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 14 -$7.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 15 -$7.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 16 -$8.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 17 -$8.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 18 -$9.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 19 -$9.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 20 -$10.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A (which has 50% chance 
of losing certain amount) or a safe option B ($0.00 for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B4: Correlation between ambiguity, risk and loss-aversion  
 
   Correlations 
Variable Observations Average Ambiguity aversion Risk aversion Loss aversion 
Ambiguity aversion 287 11.61 1   
     [# safe choices]  (3.05)    
Risk aversion 287 10.91 0.60*** 1  
     [# safe choices]  (2.81)    
Loss aversion 287 14.89 0.28*** 0.32*** 1 
     [# safe choices]  (3.09)    
*** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B5: OLS regressions of quantity, with ability2 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability -0.65 -0.85 -0.82 -0.92 -0.87 
  (correct in part 6) (0.78) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.74) 
Ability2 0.09* 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medium quality incentives -10.53*** -10.50*** -10.53*** -10.83*** 7.46 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50) (1.43) (1.43) (1.43) (1.43) (7.70) 
High quality incentives -14.08*** -14.02*** -14.10*** -14.07*** 6.00 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00) (1.42) (1.43) (1.43) (1.41) (6.37) 
Overconfidence 0.38         
 (0.50)         
Risk aversion   0.13       
   (0.21)       
Ambiguity aversion     0.06     
     (0.19)     
Loss aversion       0.41** 1.31*** 
       (0.19) (0.32) 
Loss aversion ×     -1.23** 
  Medium quality incentives     (0.50) 
Loss aversion ×     -1.37*** 
  High quality incentives     (0.43) 
Constant 27.21*** 26.83*** 27.53*** 22.51*** 9.33* 
 (2.98) (3.42) (3.42) (3.71) (5.35) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.33 
p-value, Medium = High 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -- 
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Table B6: OLS regressions of quantity, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability 0.43 0.60*** 0.57** 0.45** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -7.42*** -7.80*** 13.83 
  (2.00) (1.99) (9.53) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -14.81*** -15.40*** 20.70** 
  (2.02) (2.02) (10.47) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -14.03*** -14.50*** 12.66 
  (1.97) (1.97) (11.02) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -18.14*** -18.01*** 17.12* 
  (1.96) (1.94) (8.89) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -17.93*** -18.39*** 16.69* 
  (2.03) (2.02) (9.14) 
Loss aversion   0.45** 2.33*** 
   (0.19) (0.47) 
Loss aversion x    -1.54** 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.64) 
Loss aversion x    -2.47*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.69) 
Loss aversion x    -1.90*** 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.73) 
Loss aversion x    -2.48*** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.62) 
Loss aversion x    -2.42*** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.61) 
Constant 16.74*** 27.91*** 21.63*** -4.38 
 (1.76) (1.97) (3.23) (6.82) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.38 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B7: OLS regressions of quality, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Treatment T-$0.05  2.66*** 2.79*** -2.58 
  (0.76) (0.76) (3.71) 
Treatment T-$0.25  4.17*** 4.38*** -6.57 
  (0.77) (0.77) (4.08) 
Treatment T-$0.50  4.51*** 4.68*** -1.64 
  (0.75) (0.75) (4.29) 
Treatment T-$1.00  5.30*** 5.26*** -0.72 
  (0.75) (0.74) (3.47) 
Treatment T-$3.00  5.86*** 6.03*** -1.48 
  (0.77) (0.77) (3.56) 
Loss aversion   -0.16** -0.58*** 
   (0.07) (0.18) 
Loss aversion x    0.38 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.25) 
Loss aversion x    0.74*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.27) 
Loss aversion x    0.44 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.28) 
Loss aversion x    0.42* 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.24) 
Loss aversion x    0.52** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.24) 
Constant 0.81 -2.71*** -0.47 5.32** 
 (0.63) (0.75) (1.23) (2.66) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.58 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B8: OLS regressions of the error rate, with individual treatment dummies  
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/attempted) 
Ability -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -0.17*** -0.18*** 0.10 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -0.36*** -0.38*** 0.30 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.29) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -0.34*** -0.35*** 0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.30) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.02 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) 
Loss aversion   0.01** 0.04*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
Loss aversion x    -0.02 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.05** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.02) 
Constant 0.62*** 0.92*** 0.77*** 0.39** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.19) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.10 0.41 0.42 0.44 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B9: OLS regressions of “guesstimates”, with individual treatment dummies  
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dependent variable = “Guesstimate” (incorrect but 
within 20 of correct answer) 
Ability 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 
  (correct in part 6) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -1.69** -1.72** 4.98 
  (0.78) (0.78) (3.85) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -3.04*** -3.09*** 3.93 
  (0.79) (0.79) (4.23) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -2.59*** -2.62*** 7.71* 
  (0.77) (0.77) (4.45) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -3.96*** -3.95*** 2.25 
  (0.76) (0.76) (3.59) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -3.89*** -3.93*** 1.36 
  (0.79) (0.79) (3.69) 
Loss aversion   0.03 0.43** 
   (0.07) (0.19) 
Loss aversion x    -0.47* 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.26) 
Loss aversion x    -0.48* 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.28) 
Loss aversion x    -0.70** 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.29) 
Loss aversion x    -0.44* 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.25) 
Loss aversion x    -0.37 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.25) 
Constant 2.68*** 5.06*** 4.61*** -1.02 
 (0.61) (0.76) (1.27) (2.75) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.14 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
